

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W  
----- 046462

O 061530Z NOV 73  
FM AMEMBASSY ROME  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1683  
USINT CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ROME 12162

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1 DECLASS. IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE. BY DCM  
TAGS: PFOR, XF  
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S STOP-OVER IN ROME

CAIRO FOR THE SECRETARY

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER FAHMI STOPPED OVER IN ROME ENROUTE TO CAIRO NOVEMBER 5. IN TWO HOUR DISCUSSION WITH ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER MORO, FAHMI ESPoused FAMILIAR EGYPTIAN POSITION ON OCTOBER 22 CEASEFIRE LINES; WAS HARSHLY CRITICAL OF EUROPEAN POSITION ON MID EAST CRISIS; BRANDISHED OIL WEAPON; AND THREATENED ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL WARFARE IF ISRAELIS REFUSED TO WITHDRAW. FAHMI REJECTED MORO'S COUNTER-ARGUMENTS. ITALIANS WERE JOLTED BY AGGRESSIVE HARSHNESS OF FAHMI'S PRESENTATION AND SPECULATE THAT THIS IS INDICATIVE OF NEW, VERY TOUGH EGYPTIAN LINE ON SETTLEMENT. END SUMMARY.

2. EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER FAHMI TRANSITED ROME NOVEMBER 5 ENROUTE TO CAIRO. HE HAD TWO HOUR CONVERSATION AT AIRPORT WITH ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER MORO. ON MORNING NOVEMBER 6, FOREIGN MINISTRY SECRETARY GENERAL GAJA, WHO SAT IN ON CONVERSATION, GAVE DCM ACCOUNT OF FAHMI/MORO DISCUSSION.

3. GAJA CHARACTERIZED TONE OF DISCUSSION AS UNPLEASANT IN THE EXTREME. HE SAID FAHMI WAS AGGRESSIVE AND HARSH IN MARKED  
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CONTRAST TO PREVIOUS ITALIAN CONTACTS WITH FORMER EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS ZAYYAT AND RIAD. GAJA SPECULATED THAT FAHMI PERFORMANCE WAS INDICATIVE OF NEW AND VERY TOUGH EGYPTIAN POLICY, AND PERHAPS ALSO OF FAHMI'S PERSONAL DRIVING AMBITION. FURTHER

RE ATMOSPHERICS, GAJA SAID FAHMI REFUSED MORO'S INVITATION TO LUNCH, ASKING INSTEAD THAT MORO COME TO AIRPORT FOR MEETING WHICH EXTENDED THROUGH LUNCH PERIOD. (MORO HAD POSTPONED HIS ATTENDANCE AT EC FON MINS CONCLAVE IN BRUSSELS TO MEET WITH EGYPTIAN FONMIN.)

4. ACCORDING GAJA, FAHMI TOOK FAMILIAR LINE THAT ISRAELIS MUST RETURN TO OCTOBER 22 CEASE-FIRE LINES BEFORE THERE COULD BE ANY OTHER MOVEMENT ON MID EAST SETTLEMENT. IN RESPONSE TO MORO'S OBSERVATION THAT CEASEFIRE LINES DIFFICULT TO FIX, FAHMI ASSERTED THAT U.S. AND SOVIET SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE AND MAPS AVAILABLE TO FIELD COMMANDERS ON BOTH SIDES WERE SUFFICIENT TO FIX LINES OF OCTOBER 22. FAHMI STATED THAT IF THERE ANY DOUBTS ABOUT OCTOBER 22 LINES, EGYPTIANS WILLING TO GIVE ISRAELIS "FIVE OR TEN KILOMETERS AS BAKSHEESH".

5. ACCORDING GAJA, MAIN THRUST OF FAHMI'S PRESENTATION WAS HARSH CRITICISM OF EUROPEAN, INCLUDING ITALIAN, POSITION ON MID EAST CRISIS. FAHMI ASSERTED THAT EUROPEANS HAD SHOWN THAT THERE IS NO RPT NO SUCH THING AS EUROPE, AND THEY HAD DONE NOTHING TO ADVANCE CAUSE OF PEACE. HE SAID U.S. WEAPONS FOR ISRAEL HAD COME FROM EUROPE, AND NOT ONLY FROM FRG, BUT FROM OTHER COUNTRIES AS WELL. IN FACT, ACCORDING FAHMI, EGYPTIANS HAD BEEN FIGHTING AGAINST U.S. THROUGH MEDIUM OF ISRAEL. HE CLAIMED THAT EC DECLARATION HAD BEEN OF NO RPT NO HELP AND WHAT WAS REALLY REQUIRED OF EC WAS DECLARATION DEMANDING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO 1967 LINES. FAHMI REITERATED THAT EUROPE HAD FAILED AT TIME OF CRISIS TO SHOW UNITY, AND HAD PROVED THAT IT WAS NOT RPT NOT INDEPENDENT. FURTHER ON MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE, FAHMI SAID THAT BORDERS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED ON BASIS OF PRINCIPLE ON NON-ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE, AND IN ANY CASE EGYPT'S BORDERS WERE LONG ESTABLISHED AND NOT THEREFORE SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATION. ACCORDING GAJA, RE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, FAHMI WAS VAGUE AND SAID THIS SHOULD BE SOLVED "WITHIN CONTEXT OF EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL."

6. MOR RESPONDED THAT PREVIOUSLY ISSUED EC DECLARATION AND SECRET

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SECOND DECLARATION WHICH MAY EMANATE FROM EC FOREIGN MINISTER'S MEETING IN BRUSSELS TODAY SHOWED "SYMPATHY" FOR ARABS AND CLEARLY INDICATE "READJUSTMENT" OF POSITIONS OF SOME EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. MORO SAID ISRAELIS RECOGNIZED PRO-ARAB TILT OF EUROPEANS AND CITED PRIME MINISTER MEIR'S STATEMENT THAT EUROPEANS NOT RPT NOT ACCEPTABLE TO TAKE PART IN ANY MID-EAST PEACE CONFERENCE SINCE THEY CLEARLY PRO-ARAB. MORO SAID EUROPEAN POSITION BASED ON IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 242 WHICH ENCOMPASSES SECURITY FOR ISRAEL AND EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL, NOTING THAT EGYPTIAN POSITION ALSO SUPPORTED THESE POINTS. RE ITALY, MORO ASSERTED THAT ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HAD PAID POLITICAL PRICE OF ITS PRO-ARAB ATTITUDE IN FACE OF PRO-ISRAELI ELEMENTS IN PARLIAMENT AND PRO-ISRAELI ITALIAN PUBLIC OPINION.

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W  
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FM AMEMBASSY ROME

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USINT CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

7. FAHMI REJECTED MORO'S ARGUMENTATION. HE CONTENDED THAT EUROPEANS CONTINUE TO PUT PRINCIPAL STRESS ON SECURITY AND GUARANTEES FOR EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL WHILE IGNORING SECURITY AND GUARANTEES FOR BORDERS OF ARABS, WHO IN FACT WERE THE THREATENED PARTY. HE SAID EUROPEANS SEEM TO HAVE IGNORED FACT OF ISRELI OCCUPATION OF ARAB TERRITORY WHICH PROVED ISRAEL WAS PRINCIPAL DANGER IN AREA. FAHMI SAID EGYPTIANS ACCEPTED 1967 LINES AS BORDERS OF ISRAEL. RE PRO-ISRAELI ELEMENTS IN ITALY AND ELSEWHERE, FAHMI SAID IT WAS RESPONSIBILITY OF ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TO EDUCATE THESE ELEMENTS RE REAL FACTS OF SITUATION. IN CASE OF ITALY SPECIFICALLY, FOR EXAMPLE, PEOPLE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT ISRAELI OCCUPATION WAS CAUSE OF SUEZ CANAL CLOSURE WHICH COST ITALIANS DEAR. FAHMI SAID THAT EUROPEANS WOULD HAVE TO PROVE TO ARABS THAT THEIR POSITION WAS NOT RPT NOT THE SAME AS THAT OF ISRAEL AND IF THEY DID SO ARABS WOULD WELCOME EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN MID EAST PEACE CONFERENCE.

8. RE U.S. POSITION, MORO DEFENDED IT, EXPLAINING IT WAS BASED ON BALANCE OF POWER FACTORS. HE SAID U.S. WAS NOT RPT NOT ANTI-ARAB AND ITS ACTIONS WERE TAKEN IN CONTEXT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIPS. GAJA SAID THAT FAHMI DISMISSED THIS ARGUMENTATION, BUT DID NOT RPT NOT ACCUSE EUROPEANS OF GIVING IN TO U.S. PRESSURE ON MID EAST SITUATION.

9. ACCORDING GAJA, FAHMI FREQUENTLY BRANDISHED OIL WEAPON

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AND ASSERTED ITS USE WAS "JUST BEGINNING." HE DERIDED DUTCH "CRYING" OVER OIL EMBARGO, AND SAID OTHER EC COUNTRIES WERE BEING "CLOSELY WATCHED" IN THIS REGARD. RE OIL, GAJA COMMENTED THAT

ARABS HAD APPARENTLY GIVEN GUARANTEES TO U.K. AND FRANCE, AND HE WONDERED WHAT BRITISH AND FRENCH HAD DONE TO SECURE THESE GUARANTEES. GAJA SAID ALTHOUGH ARABS HAD IMPOSED NO RPT NO "SANCTIONS" ON ITALIANS AS YET, NEITHER HAD THEY GIVEN ITALIANS ANY GUARANTEES ABOUT OIL SUPPLY.

10. ACCORDING GAJA, FAHMI LAID GREAT STRESS ON ARAB UNITY. FAHMI THREATENED THAT IF ISRAELIS REFUSED TO WITHDRAW, WAS WOULD BE RESUMED AND IT WOULD NOT RPT NOT NECESSARILY BE MILITARY BUT COULD BE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL.

11. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION, GAJA WONDERED WHETHER FAHMI BLAST AT MORO WAS PERHAPS DESIGNED TO PUT PRESSURE ON EC FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING TODAY IN BRUSSELS. HE REITERATED THAT FAHMI'S HARSH LINE MIGHT BE INDICATIVE OF NEW AND TOUGH EGYPTIAN POSTURE. HE COMMENTED THAT IN ITALIAN VIEW, IF NEGOTIATIONS DO NOT RPT NOT START VERY SOON, SITUATION COULD BECOME VERY DANGEROUS, AND IN THIS CONTEXT HE CITED OIL BLACKMAIL. GAJA OBSERVED THAT GYRATIONS OF RADICAL ARAB LEADERS SUCH AS BOUMEDIENE AND QADHAFI WERE CERTAINLY UNHELPFUL, AND COULD HAVE EFFECT OF MAKING MODERATES LIKE SADAT AND FEISAL MORE RIGID. GAJA STATED U.S. PERSPECTIVES ON SITUATION ARE URGENTLY NEEDED. RE LATTER POINT, WE RESPONDED THAT ITALIANS WILL HAVE U.S. VIEWS FIRSTHAND DURING NOVEMBER 12 ROME VISIT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO.

12. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. VOLPE

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## Message Attributes

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**Capture Date:** 11 MAY 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** ITINERARY, FOREIGN RELATIONS, DISPUTES, NEGOTIATIONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 06 NOV 1973  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** golinofr  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1973ROME12162  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** 11652 XGDS-1 DECLASS. IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE. BY DCM  
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**Office:** ORIGIN ROME  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
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**Previous Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** golinofr  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 17 SEP 2001  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <17-Sep-2001 by kelleyw0>; APPROVED <21-Nov-2001 by golinofr>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S STOP-OVER IN ROME  
**TAGS:** PFOR, US, XF, IT, EG  
**To:** STATE  
CAIRO NIACT  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005